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We describe and evaluate options for providing anony-
mous IP service, argue for the further investigation of lo-
cal anonymity, and sketch a framework for the implemen-
tation of locally anonymous networks.
1 Introduction
Anonymity is not the same as confidentiality. Existing
systems such as IPSEC can ably protect the contents of
IP-based communication [Atk95, Pos81b], making it im-
practical for network eavesdroppers to deduce the purpose
of observed traffic. However, the fact of the traffic itself
is not hidden; the sender and receiver of each packet is
clearly visible in the packet headers even when the packet
is end-to-end encrypted. Such information should some-
times be protected as well.
Suppose that Alice, the CEO of Apricot, decides to
buy out the publicly-traded firm Banananon. When other
Apricot officers learn of the plans, the subsequent flurry of
connections from the executive suite to the Banananon’s
web site could betray Alice’s intent. If Alice’s network
administrator Eve reacts to the network connection logs
by purchasing Banananon stock, then Alice and others
could end up in serious trouble. Anonymity schemes can
prevent Eve from identifying the executive suite as the
source of the traffic, even though the traffic flows through
Eve’s equipment.
The literature defines three kinds of anonymity. We
are interested in all three as applied to IP traffic. Sender
anonymity refers to message formats and transmission
techniques that do not identify the sender. Sender
anonymity would protect Alice from Eve’s snooping in
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the above example. Receiver anonymity means that the in-
tended recipient(s) cannot be inferred from the message;
this would prevent Eve from seeing that the web traffic
concerned Banananon at all. Unlinkability means that in-
dependently observed messages seem uncorrelated even
when they comprise a single logical traffic stream.
Unlinkability only makes sense when the semantics of
the message flows do not require a priori correlations, so
unlinkability must always be considered with respect a
certain granularity. For example, TCP [Pos81c] streams
require recipients to acknowledge sent data. Therefore,
if an eavesdropper knows that a certain outbound flow
comprises a TCP stream, then they will rightly expect to
observe (at least) an inbound flow of acknowledgments.
Even without knowing which node is the communica-
tion endpoint, the eavesdropper can infer that outbound
and inbound packets concern the same TCP stream. This
implies that providing packet-level unlinkability of TCP
streams requires generating a large amount of dummy
traffic just to obscure the acknowledgment packets. It
probably makes more sense for a security designer to in-
stead take entire TCP streams as the primitive units of un-
linkability.
Often the granularity is even larger, as in the case of
most web traffic, where the first TCP connection delivers
the HTML source and separate TCP connections are cre-
ated to fetch embedded images and other secondary struc-
tures [BLC95, FGM+97]. An eavesdropper aware that an
HTML transfer is in progress would have good reason to
suspect that two back-to-back TCP streams originate from
the same node even if their source labels appear unrelated.
In general, unlinkability stands at odds with efficiency in
communication. The anonymity designer wants to disso-
ciate current communications from future ones, while the
network designer wants to minimize unnecessary delays.
Computer systems offering network anonymity fall into
two broad categories: the dispersed or global schemes
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based on large-scale multi-domain infrastructure support,
and the end-to-end or local schemes whose security fol-
lows from purely local cooperation. The first category in-
cludes trusted-host rewriting schemes such as those used
in anon.penet.fi and the Web Anonymizer. Mix-
derived [Cha81] systems such as Cypherpunk, Mixmas-
ter, and Babel remailers; Onion Routing; Crowds; and the
Non-Disclosure Method for mobile IP stations also fall
into the family of dispersed architectures. Almost as well
represented in the literature, but largely unimplemented,
are the local schemes invariably based on DC networks
[Cha88]. The following sections address both kinds of
schemes in turn.
1.1 Dispersed Anonymity Architecture
Generally speaking, the dispersed designs provide com-
prehensive untraceability in the following manner. The
promoters of a dispersed anonymous service first deposit
forwarding agents throughout the Internet. When a client
requests an anonymous connection, it aims its encrypted
data streams at or through several such agents, each of
which is entrusted to redirect the stream appropriately.
By the time the stream appears at its desired endpoint,
the receiver can only trace the nearest hop in the route.
In a Mix system, the data is additionally encoded so that
each forwarding agent, not just the ultimate receiver, can
only trace the stream one hop in either direction along
a stream’s route. Therefore, even informers close to the
source or destination of the stream can see only that the
stream is being sent on an anonymous channel, not where
the channel begins or ends. (Naturally, details and sub-
tle attacks make an actual implementation more complex
than this in practice.) Widely deployed, such a system
can be visualized as a cotton ball with threads—possible
routes—going every which way. The perspective one has
while sitting on a thread makes it very difficult to find its
endpoints.
1.2 Local Anonymity Architecture
Local anonymity schemes can support stronger untrace-
ability guarantees than global ones, but they exact severe
performance penalties and have therefore attracted little
attention among implementors. In a DC network, the best
example of local anonymity, each node in a coalition on a
local area network continually exchanges encrypted mes-
sages at a constant rate, and only a fraction of that band-
width is used for actual data transfer between nodes. The
untraceability of such data then depends directly on the
quality of random numbers used. By using one-time pads,
the source of any piece of data in the coalition can be ut-
terly hidden.
Such a design is probably unusable on any wide area
network with the poor and inconsistent latency of the
Internet for applications requiring even human interac-
tion speeds. Instead, we propose gatewaying a locally
untraceable stream over a standard high-bandwidth
channel to a remote destination. This design offers end-
to-end anonymity; although the remote site can easily see
that the data came from a particular coalition of nodes, it
is unable to identify any particular node as the data’s cre-
ator. The picture for such a scheme might be a Q-tip: a
well-defined backbone with easily locatable extremes, but
chaos when you look at the endpoints closely.
After reviewing features of the current art in Section
2, we argue for the deployment of local anonymity in
Section 3, present the outline of an flexible encapsulat-
ing framework for local schemes in Section 4, describe
two possible anonymity-realizing protocols in Section 5,
and conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Almost every implemented anonymous network ser-
vice currently described in the literature—production or
experimental—is based on a dispersed architecture. In
turn, most of these are Mix-derived. However, two low-
security simple rewriting schemes have completely domi-
nated the Internet anonymity field: the Penet mail rewriter
and the (Web) Anonymizer.
Mix networks and DC networks were both invented by
David Chaum; see [Cha81] and [Cha88] for his original
papers on the topic. Mix networks have been analyzed,
extended, and implemented in [PPW89, Pfi90, PPW91,
PP90]. DC networks are usually considered a more ele-
gant but less practical anonymity scheme than Mix net-
works. Accordingly, the literature describing DC net-
works is mostly theoretical [Wai90, WP90, Pfi90, Böt90,
DO97].
In the following sections, we briefly sketch the imple-
mentations and designs relevant to our pursuit.
2.1 Anon.penet.fi
The Internet host anon.penet.fi, maintained by Jo-
han Helsingius, ran as a cleartext email forwarding agent
from 1993 until it closed in 1996. It offered anonymity
by maintaining a private database associating real and
assigned anonymous email addresses and rewriting ad-
dresses appropriately when mail was directed through
it. Subpoenas demanding the secret mapping for specific
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email addresses were an obviously major factor in the ser-
vice’s demise; see [Hel95, New97] for details. At its peak,
the service claimed a mapping for 500,000 users and was
indisputably the most important service of its kind.
2.2 Cypherpunk Remailers
The Cypherpunk remailers remove the persistent database
from the anon.penet.fi approach, add optional en-
cryption, and allow a sender to route an email through sev-
eral remailers before hitting its destination. Without the
persistent database, no anonymous ID is available to en-
able return mail (although the service nym.alias.net
[Nym97] helps with this problem). Since there is no sin-
gle point of presence, and since the individual remailers
are very easy to set up, legal action or network attacks are
unlikely to threaten the system as a whole. While court
action or service provider protest could easily shut down a
remailer, there is no database to raid. Meanwhile, another
remailer would appear elsewhere. Cypherpunk remailers
are widely available; see [Lev].
2.3 The (Web) Anonymizer
The Anonymizer http://www.anonymizer.com,
provided by Anonymizer, Inc., can be thought of as a
remailer for HTTP [BLFN96, FGM+97] traffic. Since
HTTP transactions are completely self-contained, no
long-term mapping for return addresses is required. The
Anonymizer just removes revealing HTTP headers and re-
lays the results. As with Cypherpunk remailers, subpoe-
nas are intrinsically insufficient to recover the identity of a
past user: once an HTTP transaction completes (typically
in seconds), the Anonymizer can forget the mapping used,
and so be truly unable to comply with such demands.
However, Anonymizer, Inc. has made some interesting
policy decisions regarding the use of their service, most
of which seem fully informed by the legal reality of doing
business in California and the United States. In the Terms
and Conditions as of September 24, 1997 [Ano97b], they
write
8.3 Usage logs are usually kept for fifteen
(15) days for maintenance purposes, monitor-
ing Spamming and monitoring abuses of neti-
quette. Any relevant portion(s) of such logs
may be kept for as long as needed to stop the
abuses.
In addition, their FAQ clearly states their intention to use
these logs in order to cooperate with appropriate authori-
ties. So the service closely parallels anon.penet.fi
in terms of confidentiality even though the same tech-
nical guarantees of untraceability offered by Cypher-
punk remailers are possible. Unlike anon.penet.fi,
Anonymizer, Inc. does not intend to shut down if it is
merely required to reveal a user’s identity.
2.4 A Pedagogical Mix Network
An implementation of the Mix design was first described
in Andreas Ort’s Diplomarbeit [Ort91]. This paper de-
scribes an Appletalk-based Mix network at the Karlsruhe
Institut für Rechnerentwurf und Fehlertoleranz and a se-
ries of lab-style experiments designed for interns. At the
time, the Macintosh OS did not support multiprogram-
ming, so nodes in the experiment were either purely Mix
forwarders or specialized application endpoints. The sys-
tem supported one-way anonymous messages, not bidi-
rectional streams.
2.5 The Mixmaster and Babel Remailers
The Mixmaster for email by Lance Cottrell1 [Cot] is prob-
ably the most perfectly suited implementation of Mix
technology to date. It includes facets of the Mix design
such as replay detection, uniform sizing, buffering, and
reordering, all of which contribute to the untraceability
of messages. The technology is almost as easy to deploy
as Cypherpunk remailers, the only difference being that
one needs to use a special client for sending mail with the
Mixmaster. The Mixmaster is currently available within
the U.S. at [Cot96].
Gene Tsudik and Ceki Gülcü at IBM Zurich devel-
oped a similar remailer called Babel, described in detail
in [GT96], that improves on the design and exposition of
the Mixmaster. Babel extends the possibility of anony-
mous reply to receivers of anonymous email with reply
“onions”, a feature envisioned by Chaum [Cha81] and im-
plemented both in the Non-Disclosure Method described
below and the remailer reply service nym.alias.net
[Nym97] (which is not described here). The Babel imple-
mentation is not currently available to the public.
Generally speaking, the Mix design works well with
email because email tends to be insensitive to network la-
tency. One Mix option imposes random latencies on all
traffic in order to foil attempts to correlate the input and
output packets on a single mix node; this would obviously
not work well with latency-sensitive applications. Dis-
counting distributed and coordinated network observers
allows one to dispense with the random latencies, but mul-
1Also President of Anonymizer, Inc.
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tiple Mix hops (and the attendant latencies) are still rec-
ommended to hide identities.
2.6 Onion Routing
Michael Reed, Paul Syverson, and David Goldschlag at
the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory describe an imple-
mentation based on the Mix design called Onion Rout-
ing [GRS96, SGR97]. Their implementation defines pro-
tocols for bidirectional streams, currently rlogin, HTTP,
and SMTP (email). The forwarding nodes called onion
routers maintain permanent encrypted TCP connections
to each other, and the Mix structure is built on top of that
virtual network. Client applications encounter the anony-
mous network through the application proxy module of a
fixed and trusted onion router. The proxy then operates
on the client’s behalf.
When opening an anonymous connection stream (e.g.,
an HTTP GET from a Web browser), a proxy chooses a
random path of routers through the onion network to its
destination and constructs an onion corresponding to that
path in the classical Mix form: each layer of the onion
both represents a router in the path, and when “peeled
off”, recursively contains the remaining path encrypted
with the router’s public key. As a performance optimiza-
tion, the proxy also chooses and deposits a symmetric
key and a stream identifier into each layer to be used in
future communication on the route. Having constructed
the onion structure, the proxy injects it into the network
via the router named by the outermost layer of the onion.
This router peels off the outside layer (which only it can
do, since it alone posesses the correct private key), ex-
tracts and stores its symmetric key and stream identifier,
and passes on the remaining encrypted layers to the next
router named in the onion. By the time the onion reaches
its destination, all of the layers have been peeled off and
the proxy’s chosen route is represented in the onion net-
work by the states of the incident routers, each of which
knows the stream identifier and corresponding symmetric
key. At this point the anonymous route is complete, and
the stream identifiers and symmetric keys between nodes
are used to transfer data on that connection at high speed.
Several experimental onion networks have been estab-
lished, and a next-generation system is in progress. See
[Pri] for information on the current availability of Onion
Routing.
2.7 Crowds
Michael Reiter and Aviel Rubin of AT&T Research have
developed a system called Crowds [RR97] with the same
purview as Onion Routing but only loosely related to the
Mix design. Crowds falls nonetheless squarely into the
family of dispersed anonymity architectures. As in Onion
Routing, anonymous traffic visits a secret sequence of for-
warding nodes in the network represented by a sequence
of path identifiers and protected by symmetric keys, and
client applications use proxies to access the anonymous
network. However, an originating proxy does not choose
its own path. Instead, at the Crowds network boot time,
each forwarding node creates and sends a special path
construction packet on a random walk through the net-
work: on receiving such a packet, a node flips a coin to
decide whether to lengthen the path with a randomly cho-
sen successor node or to conclude the path at the current
node. (The expectation and variance of the path length
can thus be controlled by adjusting the coin’s bias.)
After this phase of random walks, the Crowds network
state encodes a set of secret paths: each Crowds node has
exactly one secret path beginning at that node and end-
ing at another node (possibly the same one). Further-
more, the chosen secret path is used for all subsequent
traffic originating at that Crowds node. That is, when a
client wishes to perform an anonymous transaction (such
as a Web browser issuing an HTTP GET), it contacts the
proxy side of its trusted Crowds node, which then routes
the client’s stream along the single Crowds path originat-
ing at that node.
Crowds has some advantages over Onion Routing.
Firstly, it requires much less encryption: a single sym-
metric key is shared by every node on a path and used
to protect the traffic, and no asymmetric cryptography is
required at all. Secondly, the designers have built a mech-
anism that allows both users and nodes to join and exit the
network easily. In contrast, most of the other anonymous
network implementations do not easily adapt to topology
changes. And thirdly, the ability of each node to see the fi-
nal destination of a packet allows it to choose an alternate
path in case of failure. This is impossible in a classical
Mix network because each Mix node can only see its im-
mediate neighbors on a path. However, the advertisement
of final destinations to every encountered node may also
be seen as a disadvantage, since it stands at odds with re-
ceiver anonymity.
The Crowds system is currently in alpha testing phase.
See [Cro] for more information.
2.8 The Non-Disclosure Method
The Mix-based Non-Disclosure Method (NDM) of An-
dreas Fasbender, Dogan Kesdogan, and Olaf Kubitz
[FKK96b] hides the source and destination addresses of
an IP packet from every node except the packet’s destina-
tion. Their primary application is in mobile IP, where a
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mobile computer’s current location (i.e., its transient for-
eign agent or “care-of” IP address) should not be made
public. NDM ensures this privacy by tunneling pack-
ets from the mobile station’s permanent home network
through a Mix-like network to the foreign agent responsi-
ble for final LAN delivery.
As in Onion Routing and Crowds, packets are neither
delayed nor reordered at the internal forwarding nodes.
Since the packet’s destination node (e.g., the mobile IP
station) receives the packet’s source address, it knows
where to direct its reply—no reply onions are required.
This allows every packet to be routed using an indepen-
dently chosen Mix path. In addition, each packet creates
a transient virtual circuit on the way to its destination. If
the destination turns out to be unreachable, the interven-
ing nodes can generate and transmit the appropriate ICMP
[Pos81a] error packet to the source.
In [FKK96a], the same authors compute a probabil-
ity distribution predicting the latency added by NDM us-
ing equipment assumptions accurate in 1995. For a route
through three forwarding nodes equipped with RSA hard-
ware, they estimate an additional delay of less than 100
milliseconds, which makes the system quite practical for
interactive use.
2.9 Summary
Let us summarize and make some observations about the
current art. Since our goal is to consider anonymity for
IP services in general, including those with response time
requirements, we concentrate on the properties of Onion
Routing, Crowds, and NDM. Each of these dispersed sys-
tems achieve excellent untraceability properties by cross-
ing multiple administrative domains; only the most deter-
mined, powerful, and coordinated attackers could defeat
them. In each scheme, a connection is built between a
client requesting attention from a server. Both client and
server are identified by IP addresses. Table 1 shows which
of those addresses protected from participants in a packet





Forwarding Client x x x
Agents Server x x
Internet Client x x x
Observers Server x x x
Server Client x x
Table 1: IP addresses hidden from participants in the low-
latency dispersed anonymity schemes.
3 The Case for Local Anonymity
Good as they are, the above schemes are not the end of
the story. In this section, we argue that local anonymity
has important advantages over dispersed anonymity in-
cluding sustainability in terms of performance and fault
tolerance, and responsibility. Meanwhile, we must recog-
nize its primary disadvantage: locally anonymous pack-
ets can easily be traced to a (probably small) coalition of
likely suspects.
3.1 Sustainability
Once a packet is locally anonymized and emitted, it is
treated the same as non-anonymous packets: it com-
prises the same statistics and is subject to precisely the
same routing rules as ordinary ones. Therefore, when
communicating with a remote party, a locally anony-
mous client’s packets will have service (e.g., latency and
throughput) characteristics no worse than those of the best
non-anonymous packets emerging from the same LAN.
The equipment involved in anonymization is determined
locally, so an anonymity administrator2 can take local per-
formance and management requirements into considera-
tion when deploying, improving, or eliminating the ser-
vice. There is usually considerably better network ser-
vice available between neighboring nodes than between
nodes several hops removed—often by at least one or-
der of magnitude—and this abundance of local network
resources permits the use of high security and otherwise
impractical anonymity-preserving schemes, such as DC
networks.
In short, the support of anonymity does not in itself
make the administrator beholden to external agents. Since
the policy and implementation of the local scheme falls
entirely within the administrator’s realm, it is indefinitely
sustainable, requiring attention only when the local situa-
tion changes.
A similar line of reasoning has long been used in the
networking community to inform decisions about net-
work architecture in general; it is called the end-to-end ar-
gument, and is particularly taken to heart in today’s Inter-
net. One way to phrase the argument is as follows: “The
more you rely on your neighbor to provide network ser-
vices, the more you are at his mercy.” Stateless IP routers
and TCP timeouts, retransmission, and window control
are all realizations of this principle.
Compare this to the method of dispersed anonymity
schemes. Each one superposes a meta-network onto the
real network for the sake of anonymity alone. In exchange
2The anonymity administrator need not be the general network ad-
ministrator.
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for making the identification of an endpoint or even the
neighborhood of an endpoint difficult, the administrators
have to cooperatively manage a logically distinct network
and its topology, performance, and failure modes. Such an
undertaking is fraught with real-world concerns. For in-
stance, how does a new client node join the network? Is it
required to supply a forwarding agent as well? Where can
new clients and forwarding agents tap into the existing
network, and with whom do they exchange keys? Why
should established forwarding nodes trust new ones? Do
such topology changes require manual intervention?
If 50% of the forwarding agents are unreachable,
should the reachable agents automatically pick another
route or consider it an active attack? What about 20%?
Is it ever appropriate to choose “random” paths through
the meta-network while favoring nodes with the fastest
service, or does that threaten anonymity unacceptably?
Do inconsistent views of the network topology threaten
anonymity or stability or performance?
If Alice notices that Bob seems to be reachable by In-
ternet standards but is not responding adequately to for-
warding requests, should she contact him or route around
him? Can she contact his network administrator? Is it her
responsibility to report it at all? Can she or Bob hope to
diagnose the fault without keeping some form of traffic
log? Does every node in the network have to agree on
these questions, and if so, how could an agreement possi-
bly be enforced?
Policies can be set, guidelines issued, and questions
such as these answered. Indeed, many of these ques-
tions must be addressed in locally anonymous networks
too. Nevertheless, crossing administrative domains—
the mantra of the dispersed architectures—is not a
maintenance-free proposition. In a dispersed scheme,
there have to be meetings. When something goes wrong
at Bob’s site, it will affect Alice too. In a locally anony-
mous scheme, the administrator can set policy and just let
it be.
3.2 Responsibility
One argument for network anonymity goes like this:
“Anonymity is the default mode. When you walk into
a store, the clerks do not usually know who you are, and
they have no way of finding out. Therefore, we should de-
mand the same from computer networks.” There is only
some truth in this analysis. The problem becomes clear
when you consider that masked people behave differently
than unmasked people, even among complete strangers.
Abuse has been a difficult problem in anonymous sys-
tems. The anon.penet.fi remailer was ultimately
deactivated because of abuse; after a copyright was vio-
lated by an anonymous post, the authorities took action
against the remailer owner [New97]. This case is some-
times misunderstood because it has many strange facets:
the notion that religious scripture can be copyrighted at
all, the bewildering aggressiveness with which the copy-
right owner pursued its case, the seismic culture clash be-
tween lawyers and netizens, and the international scope
and several jurisdictions involved. Still, in the final anal-
ysis, one party took offense at anonymous messages and
attacked the anonymity infrastructure in response.
This is not an isolated reaction; other remailers have
closed because of abuse. Raph Levien, who keeps statis-
tics on remailer availability, estimated in 1994 that indi-
vidual remailers last only about six months on average be-
fore being shut down by offended users and tired system
administrators [NYT94, Lev]. Anonymizer, Inc.’s pol-
icy of keeping verbose logs is clearly intended to control
abuse. At a destination site’s request, they will even pro-
gram the Anonymizer to block client requests to anony-
mously contact that site [Ano97a]. This allows sites ac-
tively interested in tracking their clientele to easily opt-out
of the anonymity mechanism altogether.
As spam, harassment, and unsolicited commercial
email become more prevalent, the administrators of ex-
isting dispersed anonymity schemes spend more and
more time defending themselves, their Internet Service
Providers, and their users against charges of abuse stem-
ming from their networks. We predict that unless the ad-
ministrators find dramatic new ways of controlling abuse,
they will find their traffic blocked from networks whose
administrators do not share their zeal for or even toler-
ance of anonymous expression. The most straightforward
option available to an administrator weary of a particu-
lar strain of abuse is to block the abuser’s anonymous
service entirely—along with all of its non-abusive mem-
bers. (Some have proposed charging for anonymous ser-
vice, where the payers can pay with anonymous electronic
cash. While this may control the flow of idle, unfinanced
spam, we do not see it rescuing the services from abuse.
Wealth and the propensity to abuse seem to run along or-
thogonal axes.)
Much has been written about the promise and peril of
anonymous messaging [Lee96, Sie95, Mos95, SM96] as-
suming the use of a scheme in which even a sender’s
neighborhood is difficult to identify. These dispersed
anonymity schemes consider all traffic equally worthy of
protection. As anonymity administrators concede that
some people do use anonymity as an untraceable offen-
sive weapon, they react by weakening the schemes to
a level where users are explicitly threatened to behave
responsibly, for instance, by keeping incriminating logs
of system use. The anonymity providers then have no
6
choice but to become arbiters of acceptable and unaccept-
able demeanor—hardly the role they or their anonymous
clients expected them to don.
In a locally anonymous network, the landscape is fun-
damentally different. Users join in a coalition because
they essentially support each other even though they are
uninterested in their respective day-to-day details. The
fact that they share an address formalizes this disinterest,
saying “I will defend my coalition members’ activities as
my own.” To the outside world, they appear as one entity.
If the unit becomes abusive, there is only one address to
block and other anonymous groups are unaffected. Even
to accuse the group of misbehaving requires addressing
all of the members, which gives them an opportunity to
revisit the terms of their cooperation and disband if nec-
essary. To insiders, they appear as a tightly-knit group
willing to share responsibility for their network use. The
proper analogy is no longer a masked shopper but rather
the impossibility of shopping alone.
We believe that local anonymity encourages responsi-
ble network use. It lends a certain amount of formal de-
niability to coalition members, not immunity, and users
may hesitate before implicating their colleagues with truly
heinous conduct. Those who do not hesitate will soon find
themselves without a functional coalition.
3.3 Applications of Local Anonymity
 A company could use local anonymity to protect it-
self from eavesdropping by a subcontractor provid-
ing on-site network infrastructure.
 Individuals in a networked apartment building or
dormitory could use local anonymity to hide indi-
vidual interests and habits from their ISP and each
other.
 Members of a political body such as the U.S. House
of Representatives could use local anonymity to pro-
vide shelter from the media, who already use sophis-
ticated technologies to scrutinize their public and pri-
vate behavior [RIS].
 Similarly, a celebrity and her staff could use local
anonymity to prevent tabloids and other rumor mon-
gers from distinguishing the celebrity’s shocking in-
terests from her staff’s shocking interests.
 Dolev and Ostrovsky [DO97] suggest a scenario
where a network connects many possible military
command sites, only one of which is ever truly ac-
tive, and the local anonymity is used to prevent the
enemy from learning the present location of the com-
manders.
 Laptop users can remain locally anonymous without
requiring the cooperation of any authorities. (Picture
a coffeehouse with ethernet drops.)
 Weak local anonymity can be deployed simply in
order to hide rich local network structures. In the
case where local traffic is not methodically hidden
from local eavesdroppers, this can be achieved with
firewalls employing proxy servers and network ad-
dress translators, both of which are already widely
deployed [CB94, CZ95].
Local anonymity can also be used in situations where a
coalition provides a service, i.e., listens for inbound con-
nections:
 Radically different Web services could be offered at
a single site in order to directly protect its clients.
As an example, the U.S. Congress could host a se-
cure (encrypted) web site on a locally anonymous
network along with the secure web site of a foreign
political party supported by Congress but unpopular
or even illegal abroad. Then remote observers would
be unable to distinguish accesses to the Congress
site from accesses to the illegal site by examining
endpoint addresses alone. Furthermore, this dis-
guises accesses without requiring the clients to in-
stall special software or hop through general-purpose
anonymizing sites. In effect, local anonymity allows
the powerful to lend their protection to the vulnera-
ble when they deem it necessary.
The above applications all suggest Internet use (i.e.,
packets routed outside of the LAN and onto the Internet
backbone). But local anonymity allows arbitrarily good
intranet protection as well; encoding a packet with IP does
not require it to leave the site.
4 A Framework for Locally Anony-
mous Systems
Local anonymity means that several nodes somehow
share a single identity; the details of that arrangement can
vary depending on the local network topology, trusted de-
vices, and desired deniability. At one extreme, all internal
equipment is trusted, and traffic is anonymous only in that
an external observer is unable to tell which internal agent
is the peer in a cross-gateway message exchange. At an-
other extreme, local nodes suspect active and/or passive
attacks from their own network infrastructure and imple-
ment a DC net to protect purely local traffic in addition to
cross-network traffic.
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Common elements across the spectrum include gate-
ways bridging internal and external traffic, connection
naming strategies, encapsulation, performance monitor-
ing, diagnostics, and so on. In the following sections
we treat some such issues independently from specific
anonymity-preserving techniques. However we assume
that coalition members are at least somewhat suspicious
of each other or their networking fabric, otherwise a sim-
ple firewalled proxying scheme could be used.
4.1 Definitions
We call a locally anonymous network a lanon (think
LANon). A lanon will usually consist of a possibly proper
subset of nodes in a LAN. However, since we construct
anonymous IP from ordinary IP, this constraint is enforced
not by policy but by the level of performance that can be
tolerated. Internal entities have access to at least some
of the lanon’s packets, while external entities have access
only to packets that emerge from a lanon gateway. Cor-
respondingly, outbound packets originate in the lanon and
cross a gateway into the Internet and inbound packets take
a reverse path. Let the source IP address of an outbound
lanon packet be called its anonymous IP address.
A connection to an external site initiated by a lanon
client is an outbound connection. For example, a Web
browser in a lanon would create many outbound TCP
connections, each of would carry both outbound and in-
bound packets. Inbound connections are defined con-
versely. Purely local connections have source and desti-
nation within the lanon. TCP is the most important and
common kind of IP connection, but UDP and other IP
“connections” are possible even though those protocols
are officially connectionless. We will concentrate on the
TCP case.
Finally, the underlying anonymity policy defines the en-
tities (nodes, links, administrators) involved, their capa-
bilities, and their trustworthiness. For each policy, the de-
signer chooses an anonymity protocol that preserves the
required anonymity. Each protocol is realized within the
framework set out below.
4.2 Uniformity
Clearly, a 1460-byte IP packet is unlikely to come from
the client side of a telnet connection. To impede monitor-
ing attacks, the packets exchanged in a lanon should be
fixed-size (after encryption).
Each anonymity protocol has to deal with gateway
contention, i.e., multiple nodes attempting to transmit
across the gateway simultaneously. If a contending packet
must be dropped, the originating node should be (anony-
mously) informed. Without that knowledge, the origi-
nating node could not tell if the packet had been dis-
carded inside the lanon, where an immediate retransmis-
sion is appropriate, or remotely, where standard IP tech-
niques apply (such as TCP timeouts). The simplest mech-
anism is for the gateway to reflect transmitted packets
back onto the lanon so that each node knows when its
packet emerged. (If the anonymity policy requires pro-
tection against active attacks, then even this becomes in-
volved; see [Wai90].)
4.3 Anonymous IP Address Sets
Here we consider methods to determine the set of anony-
mous addresses that can be used in a lanon. The set
is a relatively stable (see x4.5) global parameter shared
by lanon members. When constructing actual packets,
they choose addresses from this set using techniques from
x4.4.
Let us consider options for assigning IP addresses to
anonymous endpoints.
1. One or many IP addresses could be allocated from
the ordinary network’s pool of unused addresses.
2. One stable IP address of one of the lanon nodes could
be reclaimed as the common anonymous address.
3. Many or all of the lanon nodes’ IP addresses could
be reclaimed as anonymous addresses; multiple new
addresses could be allocated as well.
Option 1 has the superficially attractive property that
anonymous traffic can be distinguished from nonanony-
mous traffic on the lanon-carrying LAN. However, we
caution against providing standard nonanonymous service
in all but the friendliest firewalled lanons. For instance, an
anonymized node should obviously reject connections to
the TCP finger port (used to display current user statis-
tics). Likewise, the anonymous node should yield no ad-
ditional information when accessed by its nonanoymous
address.
Option 2 naturally suggests giving one of the lanon
nodes gateway responsibility in addition to its usual func-
tions. The member nodes’ capabilities, network topology,
and link protocol could strongly argue for this arrange-
ment in some cases. For instance, the center of a star net-
work is the obvious choice for a gateway to the Internet.
On a broadcast or switched network, it would make sense
to designate the fastest node as a gateway.
Option 3 may seem superfluous: if the point is to make
the lanon seem like a single node, why use multiple ad-
dresses? One justification concerns return addressing.
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When two processes on a single ordinary node simulta-
neously construct TCP connections to the same destina-
tion (e.g., http://www.netscape.com), the node
chooses two unique port numbers to identify the distinct
connections. These port numbers appear in every packet
associated with the connection.
In a lanon with a single anonymous IP address, the
same thing must happen when two lanon nodes open TCP
connections to the same destination, even though we are
now talking about two distinct computers. Since the 16-
bit port space (10 bit for certain applications) must be
shared among all lanon nodes, port numbers qualify as a
scarce resource in a lanon. But the port space available for
disambiguating connections increases linearly with the
number of available anonymous IP addresses, so assign-
ing multiple addresses provides some relief. (For purely
local connections, the port space increases quadratically.)
The LAN technology in place may require the use of
gateways anyhow. For example, in an Ethernet setting,
the router connecting the lanon to the larger network will
associate each anonymous IP address with a single Ether-
net address. It may be difficult or impossible to convince
the router to use an Ethernet multicast or broadcast ad-
dress for this purpose, so inbound packets will usually be
addressed to a particular lanon gateway node.
4.4 Indirect Connection Addressing
Indirect addressing is straightforward but expensive. Let
AIP be the set of anonymous IP addresses in the lanon,
PORT = f0; 1; : : : ; 216   1g be the set of possible port
numbers, and ATCP = AIP  PORT be the set of all
possible TCP endpoint connection identifiers. Each such
identifier is called an anonymous TCP address. A lanon
client building an outbound TCP connection should select
its source address/port pair from ATCP at random subject
to lanon uniqueness and application-specific constraints.
Randomly choosing the source label hides the node’s
identity from external (and internal) observers. Later,
when inbound packets on the same connection arrive at
the gateway, the gateway must forward it to the appropri-
ate physical node. However, the anonymity policy may
not allow the gateway to possess the mapping between
anonymous addresses and node identities. In this case the
gateway must simply broadcast the packet; the intended
receiver will then process it and every other node will
ignore it. This technique preserves receiver anonymity
within the lanon.
Not only must the anonymous TCP addresses of out-
bound connections be chosen in this manner, but clients
set up to listen for inbound connections must follow the
procedure as well. Otherwise, applications such as FTP
that rely on inbound connections will either fail or triv-
ially betray the client’s identity. This implies that sim-
ply binding a name to a socket in the Internet domain
requires lanon uniqueness negotiation, as the application
may then begin to advertise the name returned. Unfortu-
nately, client applications usually do not expect bind()
calls to take long, and so this could result in unusual ap-
plication behavior.
4.5 Lanon Membership
A lanon’s reaction to an observed or requested lanon
membership change depends intimately on the anonymity
policy in effect. In general, adding new nodes to the coali-
tion is easy and relatively risk-free. However, removing
nodes can directly threaten the anonymity of the group:
the fewer members in the group, the easier it is to identify
a node. Once a lanon becomes too small, it must wholly
disband. In this circumstance, it is appropriate to break all
known persistent (TCP) network connections, since there
is no hope of recovering them.
On the other hand, if a node crashes or otherwise re-
signs from the lanon, it should not break its network con-
nections, nor should any other node do so on its behalf.
A rapid sequence of TCP resets emitting from the lanon
would suggest that each named connection originated on
the same node, thus betraying the relationship between
previously unlinked streams. Suppressing closes and re-
sets is unfortunately not very network-friendly; hopefully,
sudden resignations will be rare. Alternatively, the lanon
could agree to periodically (perhaps once an hour) reset
only some of the connections for which inbound packets
have unexpectedly generated no response.
A nonresponsive or withdrawn gateway node is even
more difficult. In addition to the anonymity threats de-
scribed above, all of the connections using the gateway
address are in jeopardy unless the address can be resur-
rected in the lanon. In an Ethernet, another gateway could
attempt to use promiscuous ARP [CMQ87] to assume its
identity and carry its traffic. Whether this would work or
not depends on the LAN’s border router.
The anonymity policy may require that each lanon
node transmit locally before a gateway emits an outbound
packet so that no conclusions can be drawn about the
packet’s origin by observing internal sequencing. What
if a lanon node instead transmits nothing in one round?
Perhaps it is a transient fault. If none of the other lanon
clients requested a packet emission either, then the gate-
way could temporarily forgive the lapse. Similarly, if the
gateway has recently been continously emitting packets,
it could emit one in this round in spite of the nonreport-
ing node on the grounds that the packet could have been
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queued. (Such laxity is possible only in some anonymity
protocols. In a DC network, none of the lanon nodes’
transmissions are even decryptable until all of them ar-
rive.) After too many rounds of nonresponse, the fault
must be treated as a resignation.
5 Anonymity Protocols
We now briefly sketch two lanon anonymity protocols:
trusted gateways and DC networks. In each of these, in-
bound packets are broadcast in the lanon when they ar-
rive at the appropriate gateway. Outbound packets require
considerably more work.
5.1 Trusted Gateways
If one node is trusted by all of the other participating
nodes, then it can be designated a lanon gateway. To
produce one outbound packet, the other nodes contact
the gateway in round-robin fashion using authenticated
secret-key cryptography until every node has submitted a
packet. The gateway then chooses a single packet among
them and emits it. Inbound packets are broadcast to the
lanon after being authenticated by the gateway.
This arrangement hides source and destination ad-
dresses from all non-gateway participants, including the
network infrastructure. In addition, multiple trusted gate-
ways can cooperate to provide better scalability. How-
ever, the resulting lanon is nowhere near as secure or com-
pelling as one based on DC networks.
5.2 DC networks
It is possible to distribute the gateways’ knowledge among
all of the participant nodes, protected by a kind of secret-
sharing scheme:
Consider an undirected connected graph (V;E) with
n lanon member nodes at the vertices and each edge
fi; jg 2 E representing a shared but secret random
packet stream r(fi; jg; t) between the two nodes. This
key-sharing graph is fixed by an anonymity administra-
tor according to the desired attack resistance and perfor-
mance requirements. In communication round t, each
lanon node i chooses the packet p(i; t) it wants to emit
through a gateway and broadcasts the sum
b(i; t) := p(i; t) +
X
j:fi;jg2E
sign(i  j) r(fi; jg; t)
onto the lanon. (Note that “sharing” a random key stream
might mean that the related nodes negotiate a new key






of all of the broadcast sums. Since the graph is undi-






If exactly one of the nodes i wanted to send a nonzero
packet p(i; t), then g(t) = p(i; t). (Otherwise, a collision
resolution procedure must follow, see [Cha88, Mar88,
BdB90, Pfi90, Wai90] for options.) Each gateway in the
system checks to see if the packet g(t) bears its address in
its source field, and if so, that gateway assumes responsi-
bility and transmits the packet out of the lanon.
If the packet streams r(fi; jg; t) are truly random, then
senders are perfectly untraceable in the following sense.
For each observed partial sum and each suspicion regard-
ing the identity of the sender, there exist equally many
random packet streams r̂(fi; jg; t) that are consistent with
the suspicion. In other words, all suspicions are equally
plausible and therefore equally worthless. As long as the
packet streams r(fi; jg; t) are secret and random, no in-
formation about the true senders is leaked.
This protocol and the original untraceability proof is
due to Chaum [Cha88]. It has been extended in [Pfi90,
Wai90, WP90], where it is known as superposed sending.
The above formulation is from [Wai90, WP90].
5.3 Minimizing Latency
Trusted gateways and DC nets require every node to trans-
mit at least once before a single packet emerges from the
lanon. This means that an n-node lanon based on a phys-
ical broadcast LAN (such as ethernet) can transmit across
its gateways at only O(1=n) of the LAN’s natural capac-
ity.
On the other hand, a lanon built on a switched LAN is
well-suited to a simple parallel divide-and-conquer com-
munication reduction. (Switched networks allow any par-
tition of their nodes into disjoint pairs to communicate si-
multaneously at the LAN’s full natural speed. Examples
of such networks include ATM and switched ethernet.)
Figure 1 shows a reduction schedule on 16 nodes in 4
stages. In stage 1, the top row of children nodes transmit
to their parents in the second row, while the third row
of children simultaneously transmits to the parents in the
fourth row. (To avoid clutter in the diagram, only the top-
left-most transmission is labeled with the stage number.)
In the second stage, the second row transmits to the fourth
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row. At the end of the fourth stage, all nodes have had
a chance to influence the lower-right gateway node. In
general, an n-node lanon based on a switched LAN can







Figure 1: A reduction on 16 nodes. Each node con-
tributes to the system output, which is produced after only
log 16 = 4 rounds.
5.3.1 Trusted Gateways
One must be careful when attempting to minimize latency
on trusted gateways; a naı̈ve implementation of this reduc-
tion could well result in worse latency than the n-node
round-robin schedule. Since each node encrypts using
a secret key shared only with the gateway, no interior
node in the schedule can tell whether it is being asked
to forward random data—indicating that the child had no
packet to send—or a real packet. There are few choices. If
interior nodes forward both packets to their parents, then
the last transmission to the gateway alone would take al-
most as long as the entire round-robin schedule would
have taken (discounting overhead). If nodes choose be-
tween the two packets at random (with appropriate bi-
ases so as not to starve the children at greater depth), then
each node would have to wait n rounds on average to ad-
dress the gateway in addition to the logarithmic latency
imposed by the reduction schedule. Worse yet, this ex-
pected wait is unconditional, i.e., a node would endure the
wait even if it were the only node in the system wishing
to transmit.
Consider this refinement: suppose that interior nodes
always forward their child’s packet unless they also have
their own packet to send, in which case they choose
between them by flipping an appropriately biased coin.
This assures each node equal access to the gateway, and
furthermore, the gateway is certain to emit a packet if
any lanon node wishes to send. But it also changes the
anonymity properties of the system. By measuring the
proportion of their packets that emerge from the gateway,
children can detect whether parents are transmitting and
so zero in on suspected communication endpoints. While
tradeoffs such as these are possible, their consequences
must be kept in mind.
5.3.2 DC Networks
In a DC net, each node’s output is the sum of its inputs
and the shared secret keys it holds with its neighbors. By
adopting Figure 1 as the communication schedule of a DC
net, the gateway utilization improves to O(1= logn)—the
packets do not grow, and no choice between packets is
necessary. However, as a key-sharing graph, it provides
poor sender anonymity: node B always knows whether
A has a packet to send or not, since B knows all of the
random key streams that A does (viz., the one associated
with the edge labeled 1 in Figure 1.) A good key-sharing
graph should have no such isolated points of failure.
Formally, an undirected graph G is k-connected if, af-
ter removing any k   1 of its edges, it still contains a
path between each pair of its vertices. Thus a 1-connected
graph is connected in the usual sense of the word, and a
2-connected graph remains connected even after the elim-
ination of any single edge. A good key-sharing graph
must be at least 2-connected, otherwise (as in the ex-
ample above) it will contain nodes that always know ex-
actly what their neighbors transmit. In general, at least k
lanon nodes must collude in order to compromise a single
sender’s anonymity in a k-connected key-sharing graph.
For anonymity purposes, the key-sharing graph and the
communication schedule do not interact. But the keys of
the key-sharing graph do need to be generated and ex-
changed, and the frequency of this exchange affects the
system’s susceptibility to cryptanalytic attacks. In other
words, the successful cryptanalysis of keys is as good as
intentional lanon node collusion to a passive attacker.
Therefore, to increase a DC net’s resistance to attack,
one should increase its key-graph connectivity and the
frequency of its key generation and exchange. But the
connectivity of the key-sharing graph affects the commu-
nication complexity of the key exchange. In a frequent
exchange situation, then, it is important to choose a key-
sharing graph having a communication schedule that also
minimizes latency (perhaps by maximizing parallelism)
on the network topology at hand.
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6 Conclusion
Local anonymity complements the privacy offered by
existing dispersed anonymity schemes. When endpoint
neighborhood identification is not confidential, lanons can
take advantage of high-performance local networks to
provide strong privacy guarantees without incurring any
additional dependence on foreign agents’ policies, perfor-
mance, or reliability. Since tracing a packet to a lanon
(but no further) is trivial, lanon users will tend to behave
responsibly, thus easing the burden on faraway anonymity
administrators and the network community at large.
In this paper we have sketched a framework for local
anonymity that allows nodes’ local anonymity to be pre-
served even when their packets leave the lanon for ser-
vice in the wider Internet. The recommended techniques
include IP address reuse, gatewaying, indirect address-
ing with distributed uniqueness, and trusted gateways or
DC networks. Ongoing research focuses more directly
on encapsulation issues and the underlying anonymity-
preserving protocols.
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[Böt90] Manfred Böttger. Realisierung des DC-Netz-
Versuchs und einer einheitlichen Praktikums-
Netzschnittstelle (Realization of a DC-
Network and Uniform Network Interface In-
cluding Lab Experiments). Diplomarbeit,
Universität Karlsruhe, Institut für Rechner-
entwurf und Fehlertoleranz, 1990. In Ger-
man.
[CB94] W. Cheswick and S. Bellovin. Firewalls and
Internet Security. Addison-Wesley, 1994.
[Cha81] David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail,
return addresses, and digital pseudonyms.
Communications of the ACM, 24(2), Febru-
ary 1981.
[Cha88] David Chaum. The dining cryptographers
problem: Unconditional sender and recipient
untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1:65–
75, 1988.
[CMQ87] S. Carl-Mitchell and J. Quarterman. Using
ARP to implement transparent subnet gate-
ways. RFC 1027, 1987.
[Cot] Lance Cottrell. Mixmaster and remailer
attacks. See http://obscura.com/
loki/remailer-essay.html.




[Cro] Crowds home page. See http://www.
research.att.com/projects/
crowds.
[CZ95] D. B. Chapman and E. Zwicky. Building In-
ternet Firewalls. O’Reilly & Associates Inc.,
1995.
[DO97] Shlomi Dolev and Rafail Ostrovsky. Ef-
ficient anonymous multicast and reception.
In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of
CRYPTO ’97, 1997. to appear.
[FGM+97] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk,
and T. Berners-Lee. Hypertext transfer pro-
tocol — HTTP/1.1. RFC 2068, 1997.
[FKK96a] Andreas Fasbender, Dogan Kesdogan, and
Olaf Kubitz. Analysis of security and privacy
in mobile IP. In 4th International Conference
on Telecommunication Systems Modeling &
Analysis, Nashville, USA, March 1996.
[FKK96b] Andreas Fasbender, Dogan Kesdogan, and
Olaf Kubitz. Variable and scalable security:
Protection of location information in mobile
IP. In Mobile IP, 46th IEEE Vehicular Tech-
nology Society Conference, Atlanta, March
1996.
12
[GRS96] David Goldschlag, Michael Reed, and Paul
Syverson. Hiding routing information.
Workshop on Information Hiding, May 1996.
Cambridge, UK.
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